When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user's delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the…
When a pgAdmin 4 connection was not meant to use a Kerberos user's delegated credentials, pgAdmin removed KRB5CCNAME from its environment, so the Kerberos library fell back to the default credential cache, or a client keytab, of the operating-system account running pgAdmin. libpq then answered any server that asked for GSSAPI authentication with that account's ticket, whatever user name the pgAdmin user gave, so in server mode any user could connect as the service account's Kerberos principal; gssencmode=disable did not prevent it. On Windows, SSPI used the service account's logon in the same way. psql was also started with pgAdmin's environment, which could hold another user's credential ca
Read at NIST National Vulnerability Database (CVE API 2.0)
- Vendor
- Pgadmin.Org
- Product
- pgAdmin 4
- CVSS v3.1
- 8.2 AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.003 (p20)
- Weakness
- CWE-522, CWE-1188
- Exposure class
- Identity
- NVD status
- Received
Why it ranks 34 (Notable)
- CVSS v3.1 8.2 high
- Exposed product class: identity
- Widely deployed vendor product (Pgadmin.Org)
- Recency: items published within 24 hours gain 15, within 72 hours 6, within 7 days 2.