Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when…
Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Lo
Read at NIST National Vulnerability Database (CVE API 2.0)
- Product
- ImageMagick / Ghostscript / FFmpeg / libxml2
- CVSS
- 6.5
Why it ranks 9 (Routine)
- CVSS 6.5 medium
- Covered by 2 independent sources
- Recency: items published within 24 hours gain 15, within 72 hours 6, within 7 days 2.
Links
- NIST National Vulnerability Database (CVE API 2.0) (nvd.nist.gov)
- CVE-2026-107335 on this site · NVD · CVE.org · Vulnpedia
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